Doug
Voyager
Lurking within...the car deck.
Posts: 2,213
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Post by Doug on Nov 20, 2005 14:57:50 GMT -8
Does anyone have any details of the disaster...namely Cascade? Here is someone's personal Website about the disaster here: www.kolumbus.fi/estonia/ .
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Ferryman
Voyager
Posts: 7,473
Member is Online
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Post by Ferryman on Nov 20, 2005 15:13:29 GMT -8
I remember Brian Williams writing a huge thing about it last year about that disaster in the Non BC Ferries section, which I actually had no idea about until I found this site.
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Post by Balfour on Nov 20, 2005 15:59:38 GMT -8
Somebody posted that site last year on here. It could have been Brian Williams.
(Post #2000!!!)
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Post by Political Incorrectness on Nov 20, 2005 16:04:05 GMT -8
I remember that there was a website with huge detail and the fault of the disaster was the bow door open and it caused an effect in BC for the bow doors on the Q of PR and QOTN Bow doors to be weleded shut
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Ferryman
Voyager
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Member is Online
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Post by Ferryman on Nov 20, 2005 16:31:48 GMT -8
But they can still open now. I believe they put a series of watertight doors in front of the lifting bow doors, from what I remember Ultra Walker saying last month when he and a few other members on this board went on the positioning cruise.
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Post by Low Light Mike on Nov 21, 2005 18:11:26 GMT -8
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Post by Balfour on Nov 21, 2005 21:34:30 GMT -8
But they can still open now. I believe they put a series of watertight doors in front of the lifting bow doors, from what I remember Ultra Walker saying last month when he and a few other members on this board went on the positioning cruise. I also heard on John's Website that they installed titanium pins.
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Post by Starbucks Queen on Nov 24, 2005 15:42:50 GMT -8
www.factgroup.nu/fgframe_eng.htmlheiwaco.tripod.com/e7.htmHere two interestisng links. One reason why the Estonia sank, was the construction of the bowdoor and the ramp behind. The ramp was in connection with the bow-visor via a housing, so when the hinges of the bow visor broke, the ramp was pulled open too. This would not have happened with designs, which had the ramp installed a bit more behind and separated from the bow-visor. The ship as well did - concerning Bureau Veritas not have the permission to sail in open sea. Quetion is here then, how it was possible that it was still put on traffic between Tallinn and Stockholm although there would have been requirements for modifications of beforementioned bow-door & ramp ?
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Post by BrianWilliams on Jun 19, 2007 22:08:28 GMT -8
I am glad that MV Estonia is still receiving some attention. Yes, I did write a couple of essays on the subject. Estonia's tragedy was the worst maritime passenger disaster in living memory - in the industrialized world. MV Estonia flooded, capsized and sank in a September storm in the inland Baltic Sea. Several other ferries passed through the storm without damage that night; most of them rushed to Estonia's aid. 28 Sep 1994 is a date to live forever in infamy. A modern ferry killed over 90% of its complement of 989 passengers and crew. Even the the Titanic saved 1/3 of her people. There are many internet sources. Many are argumentative speculations. The two chief contenders are the official Sweden-Finland-Estonia commission (JAIC) found at www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/estonia/index.html and the opposing "German Experts Group" www.estonia.xprimo.de/estonia/index.htmlAfter much reading, I find that JAIC has the weight of evidence. I also recommend William Langewiesche's lengthy account, first published in The Atlantic magazine, and then a main section in his excellent book "The Outlaw Sea". All BC libraries have this. I believe Langewiesche and JAIC. Estonia got into trouble because of poor maintenance and reckless shiphandling in moderately bad weather. But she killed nearly 900 people because of a completely untrained crew who had no leadership, no organization, and no idea of when to begin an evacuation. MV Estonia had lifeboats, rafts and PFDs enough to save 2,000 people. Few were used. A lesson for us: If we ever gripe at the cost of training BC Ferries' workers, and chafe at the wages of trained people who work in BCF gift shops and cafeterias ... these people will save your life in an emergency. Unlike the civilian stewards, cashiers and bartenders on the Estonia.
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Post by BrianWilliams on Jun 19, 2007 22:49:45 GMT -8
A PS on the bow-visor controversy:
Read the independently-researched Langewiesch book for a clear explanation, but I'll summarize:
MV Estonia's visor was not watertight, but a sea-breaker. The internal ramp, when closed, was meant to seal tightly against the hull, providing a watertight bow for the ship. She could sail safely without the visor.
JAIC and Langewiesche report that the ramp didn't close properly, and hadn't sealed for several trips in 1994. Ironically, Swedish marine inspectors were suspicious of MV Estonia's integrity, says Langewiesche, but had no opportunity to inspect her bow.
She loaded bow-first at Tallinn and discharged through her stern ramps at Stockholm. The Swedes never saw her bow visor and ramp in operation.
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Mill Bay
Voyager
Long Suffering Bosun
Posts: 2,886
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Post by Mill Bay on Jan 10, 2008 13:32:33 GMT -8
New article on the Estonia disaster SIMULATING A FATAL TURNScientists Unveil Cause of Estonia Ferry Disasterwww.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,527875,00.html (Not sure why the link didn't come through intact... It will need to be copied and pasted.
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Mirrlees
Voyager
Bathtub!
Deck Engineer- Queen of Richmond
Posts: 1,013
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Post by Mirrlees on Jan 10, 2008 23:32:42 GMT -8
Excellent article Mill Bay, It sounds as though the Estonia's crew forgot about the laws of Physics as they had no idea about how much water flooded the car deck.
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Post by ruddernut on Jan 25, 2008 18:36:38 GMT -8
A lesson for us: If we ever gripe at the cost of training BC Ferries' workers, and chafe at the wages of trained people who work in BCF gift shops and cafeterias ... these people will save your life in an emergency. Unlike the civilian stewards, cashiers and bartenders on the Estonia. Are you sure they too won't panic, abandon their duties and run for their lives?
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Post by WettCoast on Jan 25, 2008 20:44:34 GMT -8
By all accounts the crew's performance during the QotN's abandonment was exemplary. This would be with the possible exception of a few who's actions or lack there of may have caused the accident.
Certainly no one turned and ran, and some went through a very trying experience in their below the waterline cabins...
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Post by Low Light Mike on Jan 25, 2008 22:19:29 GMT -8
A lesson for us: If we ever gripe at the cost of training BC Ferries' workers, and chafe at the wages of trained people who work in BCF gift shops and cafeterias ... these people will save your life in an emergency. Unlike the civilian stewards, cashiers and bartenders on the Estonia. Are you sure they too won't panic, abandon their duties and run for their lives? Billy, you sure are a sceptic. You can't be perfectly-sure of very much, you can be reasonably sure of much.
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Post by Anders Bjrkman on Jan 26, 2008 4:09:55 GMT -8
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Koastal Karl
Voyager
Been on every BC Ferry now!!!!!
Posts: 7,747
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Post by Koastal Karl on Mar 14, 2011 10:45:20 GMT -8
I dont know if this has been posted but I was surfing youtube a week or so ago and I found the documentry that was on TV about the Sinking of the Estonia.
there are 5 parts. I dont know if anyone has seen this before but I think I remember seeing parts from this on TV years ago.
and a bunch of other videos on the sinking including a simulated sinking sequence
Mayday Call
Thought this stuff pretty interesting.
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timo
Deckhand
Posts: 57
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Post by timo on May 26, 2011 5:41:13 GMT -8
Just a few comments to this. First of all - I would not be so quick as to condemn the entire crew. Let us look at some facts: From the ship starting to list to her capsizing there was something like 10-15 minutes. This was mostly spent in a ship listing more than 25 degrees. Even if the captain had ordered a full emergency procedure, this would have been quite hard to make work, as not only would they have to try to evacuate the vessel - they would also needed to try to stay alive. I have a gut feeling that this time it was just that - staying alive. The situation was something totally different than the sinking of the QUEEN OF THE NORTH. Still, several mistakes were made and I will now point out the biggest mistakes in my opinion. As you know, the ESTONIA was built 1980 as a (technical) sister vessel to the DIANA II. The story behind it is that DIANA II was built for Rederi AB Slite, Sweden, to serve on the Naantali-Kapellskär run for Viking Line under the Swedish flag and delivered in 1979. Viking Line was formed by three companies, one Swedish, two Finnish. One of the Finnish partners wanted one more ferry as soon as possible, so they ended up ordering a modified DIANA II, lengthened 24 meters. As the ship was lengthened, it became obvious that also the bulbous bow needed lengthening, and thus the ramp needed to be longer. For cost reasons it was decided to build a one piece ramp, instead of a folding one. This ramp then needed to be covered for winter weather -so this idiotic ramp casing was installed on the visor. DIANA II was classed by Bureau Veritas and controlled by the Swedish maritime authorities. When it came to the VIKING SALLY as the sister would be called, there came a unique problem. The ship was classed by Bureau Veritas - but as Finland in those days did not have their own maritime authorities perform vessel check ups, they bought these and other services from Bureau Veritas. Of course Bureau Veritas could not find anything wrong in their own design... VIKING SALLY was built for Turku-Stockholm service, and was never intended to go outside these waters. After change of ownership the ship ended up in Estonia, and the buyer was a Swedish company with considerable experience in other types of ships, but not ferries. She was just put into service on an open sea route - and nobody noticed it was at best disputable if she should be allowed to operate on such a route without installing another water tight door behind the ramp. The captains mistakes were at least two - first - not reduce speed, and second - when in trouble he did not panic. With this I mean that I have the impression that valuable time was lost in first trying to find out if something is wrong and if that happens - then act. As step one, when in doubt they should have immediately slowed down and turn north with reduced speed, then go and see if there is any danger. Somehow caution was not built into the system, though. Part of this needing to find out what happened is of course dependent on the daft placing of the bridge. Compare pictures of the VIKING SALLY & DIANA II and you will know what I mean. Links below. As a result, one could not see from the bridge that the visor was moving - or missing. www.faktaomfartyg.se/diana_II_1979_b_10.htmwww.faktaomfartyg.se/estonia_1980_bild_2.htmI do not mean that the crew was in no ways to blame. This time there was fault already built into the design, there had been made several administrative errors, the company was not entirely up to specs to what they were doing and finally, the crew part, even if they had what might in some ways have been one of the best maritime educations in the world, still a fear not to act unless ordered to do so - a too large a respect for the captain. They had been trained in the Soviet Union - and this had a small role in what happened as well. And, when blaming the crew - remember that nobody from the bridge survived. In my opinion this proves they were working on solving the problem, not panicking and saving them selves. It is an altogether different story that they failed - but I doubt that given these premises anybody else would have succeeded. As for anything provided by Heiwaco... I think I must in all fairness remind you that the person behind it also well known in the maritime world. A company used him in trying to find out whether or not certain ship types were safe and could be used for their purposes. He gave them a green light - and the rest is history. Although there were less casualties than on the ESTONIA, there were still casualties as these ships were unstable in damaged condition. Three of them sank from different reasons. A link to the ships on a Swedish site: www.faktaomfartyg.se/petrarca_1971.htmwww.faktaomfartyg.se/boccaccio_1970.htmwww.faktaomfartyg.se/free_enterprise_VI_1972.htmwww.faktaomfartyg.se/petrarca_1971.htm
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kasco
Oiler (New Member)
Posts: 10
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Post by kasco on Jul 22, 2011 2:45:13 GMT -8
Just a few comments to this. First of all - I would not be so quick as to condemn the entire crew. Let us look at some facts: From the ship starting to list to her capsizing there was something like 10-15 minutes. This was mostly spent in a ship listing more than 25 degrees. Even if the captain had ordered a full emergency procedure, this would have been quite hard to make work, as not only would they have to try to evacuate the vessel - they would also needed to try to stay alive. I have a gut feeling that this time it was just that - staying alive. The situation was something totally different than the sinking of the QUEEN OF THE NORTH. Still, several mistakes were made and I will now point out the biggest mistakes in my opinion. As you know, the ESTONIA was built 1980 as a (technical) sister vessel to the DIANA II. The story behind it is that DIANA II was built for Rederi AB Slite, Sweden, to serve on the Naantali-Kapellskär run for Viking Line under the Swedish flag and delivered in 1979. Viking Line was formed by three companies, one Swedish, two Finnish. One of the Finnish partners wanted one more ferry as soon as possible, so they ended up ordering a modified DIANA II, lengthened 24 meters. As the ship was lengthened, it became obvious that also the bulbous bow needed lengthening, and thus the ramp needed to be longer. For cost reasons it was decided to build a one piece ramp, instead of a folding one. This ramp then needed to be covered for winter weather -so this idiotic ramp casing was installed on the visor. DIANA II was classed by Bureau Veritas and controlled by the Swedish maritime authorities. When it came to the VIKING SALLY as the sister would be called, there came a unique problem. The ship was classed by Bureau Veritas - but as Finland in those days did not have their own maritime authorities perform vessel check ups, they bought these and other services from Bureau Veritas. Of course Bureau Veritas could not find anything wrong in their own design... VIKING SALLY was built for Turku-Stockholm service, and was never intended to go outside these waters. After change of ownership the ship ended up in Estonia, and the buyer was a Swedish company with considerable experience in other types of ships, but not ferries. She was just put into service on an open sea route - and nobody noticed it was at best disputable if she should be allowed to operate on such a route without installing another water tight door behind the ramp. The captains mistakes were at least two - first - not reduce speed, and second - when in trouble he did not panic. With this I mean that I have the impression that valuable time was lost in first trying to find out if something is wrong and if that happens - then act. As step one, when in doubt they should have immediately slowed down and turn north with reduced speed, then go and see if there is any danger. Somehow caution was not built into the system, though. Part of this needing to find out what happened is of course dependent on the daft placing of the bridge. Compare pictures of the VIKING SALLY & DIANA II and you will know what I mean. Links below. As a result, one could not see from the bridge that the visor was moving - or missing. www.faktaomfartyg.se/diana_II_1979_b_10.htmwww.faktaomfartyg.se/estonia_1980_bild_2.htmI do not mean that the crew was in no ways to blame. This time there was fault already built into the design, there had been made several administrative errors, the company was not entirely up to specs to what they were doing and finally, the crew part, even if they had what might in some ways have been one of the best maritime educations in the world, still a fear not to act unless ordered to do so - a too large a respect for the captain. They had been trained in the Soviet Union - and this had a small role in what happened as well. And, when blaming the crew - remember that nobody from the bridge survived. In my opinion this proves they were working on solving the problem, not panicking and saving them selves. It is an altogether different story that they failed - but I doubt that given these premises anybody else would have succeeded. As for anything provided by Heiwaco... I think I must in all fairness remind you that the person behind it also well known in the maritime world. A company used him in trying to find out whether or not certain ship types were safe and could be used for their purposes. He gave them a green light - and the rest is history. Although there were less casualties than on the ESTONIA, there were still casualties as these ships were unstable in damaged condition. Three of them sank from different reasons. A link to the ships on a Swedish site: www.faktaomfartyg.se/petrarca_1971.htmwww.faktaomfartyg.se/boccaccio_1970.htmwww.faktaomfartyg.se/free_enterprise_VI_1972.htmwww.faktaomfartyg.se/petrarca_1971.htm If my memory is correct, the vessel was taking in water through the bow for some time before action was taken. This was pointed out on the vessel's video system. The design of the Estonia allowed water to collect on the main deck. When the ingress of water through the bow was finally reported, it was already to late to save the vessel.
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Post by dofd on Jul 22, 2011 23:43:49 GMT -8
I started the linked to the Estonia tape and ended watching (listening) to all 5 tapes.
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